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REFUTATIONS AND THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 
David Reid, Christine Knipping, and Matthew Crosby 
When arguments are refuted in mathematics classrooms, the ways in 
which they are refuted can reveal something about the logic of practice 
evolving in the classroom, as well as about the epistemology that guides 
the teachers’ teaching. We provide four examples that illustrate refuta-
tions related to the logic of practice, in which sufficiency and relevance 
are grounds for refutation, as opposed to falsehood. 
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Refutaciones y la Lógica de la Práctica 
Cuando se refutan argumentos en el aula, las maneras en que se refutan 
pueden revelar algo acerca del desarrollo de la lógica de la práctica en 
el aula, así como de la epistemología que guía la enseñanza. Presenta-
mos cuatro ejemplos que ilustran refutaciones relacionadas con la lógi-
ca de la práctica, en los que la suficiencia y pertinencia, y no la false-
dad, son los motivos de refutación. 
Términos clave: Enseñanza; Epistemología; Lógica de la práctica; Pertinencia; 
Pruebas; Refutación; Suficiencia 
At first glance, refutations may seem to have little to do with teaching proof. 
Proofs are concerned with showing what conclusions follow from a set of prem-
ises, whereas refutations only tell us what conclusions do not follow. There are, 
of course, special cases, like proof by contradiction and contraposition, in which 
one seeks to refute one statement in order to prove its negation. However, we are 
not concerned with these cases here. Instead we are interested in the kind of refu-
tations that appear in the proving process through which proofs evolve in math-
ematics classrooms, but which are not evident in the finished proof.  
We are interested in these refutations in relation to what Toulmin (1958) 
calls the logic of practice, which underlies proving processes in classrooms. That 
is, the logic upon which arguments are based in actuality, rather than the logic 
upon which one might like them to be based. As mathematics classrooms are 
contexts for learning, arguments in them are based on a logic in transition from 
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the everyday logic the students bring to the class to a mathematical logic accept-
ed by the teacher. When arguments are refuted, the ways in which they are refut-
ed can reveal something about the logic of practice as well as the teachers’ pur-
pose in engaging in argument in the first place and what epistemology guides 
their teaching. 
BACKGROUND 
As Balacheff (2002) noted, the field of mathematics education includes ap-
proaches based on a number of distinct epistemologies. The role seen for refuta-
tions depends on epistemological factors. For example, for those whose focus is 
on the logical correctness of formal texts called “proofs”, refutations do not play 
a role except perhaps in the special cases of proofs by contradiction and contra-
position. Others’ epistemology is based to some extent on Lakatos’ (1976) view 
of mathematics, in which mathematics does not proceed by a process of proving 
theorems conclusively and then moving on, but rather through a cycle of proofs 
and refutations, with proofs being always provisional and refutations providing 
the mechanism for the improvement of theorems and their proofs. For those with 
this epistemology, proof is inextricably linked to refutations, and approaches to 
teaching proof from this perspective include an exploration of refutations as an 
essential element (Balacheff, 1988, 1991; Sekiguchi 1991). Another epistemolo-
gy for which proofs are essential is that founded on the concept of cognitive uni-
ty in which argumentation processes!which may include refutations!provide 
the basis for proof development (Boero, Garuti, Lemut, & Mariotti, 1996). 
Studying the role of refutations in classroom proving processes is important if 
one takes on an epistemology that gives an important role to refutations, e.g., one 
based on Lakatos (1976) for cognitive unity, but also for descriptive and compar-
ative work looking at current teachers’ practices, as a way to reveal the implicit 
epistemologies guiding teaching. It is such an interest in teaching practices that 
inspires our work. In classrooms we observe a proving process through which 
teacher and students produce a proof, and which can include refutations in im-
portant ways. In this paper we describe a number of examples of refutations em-
bedded in proving processes, their roles in those processes, and what these roles 
suggest about the teaching practices and implicit epistemologies underlying 
them. 
One of Toulmin’s (1958) aims was to describe the layout of arguments in a 
way that is independent of the field in which they occur. In this paper we dia-
gram arguments using a method derived from Toulmin’s basic layout for an ar-
gument (see Figure 1). In this layout an argument is considered to consist of data, 
which lead to a conclusion, through the support of a warrant.  
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Figure 1. Toulmin’s basic layout 
(D: Data, W: Warrant, C: Conclusion) 
Toulmin does not consider refutations within this structure because he is consid-
ering arguments as they are, once the assertion is established, not the process of 
their coming to be. However, Toulmin’s first chapter deals extensively with refu-
tations in order to explore how arguments in different fields are based on differ-
ent criteria. There he gives examples of arguments in which an assertion is made 
which is true in one field but which can be refuted in another field. Looking at 
Toulmin’s basic layout, three ways in which an argument can involve a refuta-
tion immediately suggest themselves. The data of the argument can be refuted, 
leaving the conclusion in doubt. The warrant of the argument can be refuted, 
again leaving the conclusion in doubt. Or the conclusion itself can be refuted, 
implying that either the data or the warrant is invalid, but not saying which. In 
the language of Lakatos (1976) the first two are local counterexamples, while the 
latter type is a global counterexample. Sekiguchi (1991) provides examples in a 
classroom context of several types of refutations within this framework. Howev-
er, as we noted above, we are more interested in refutations where the focus of 
the refutation is not the data, conclusion or warrant, but rather the logic underly-
ing the argument. 
REFUTATION IN CLASSROOM ARGUMENTS 
In our research we have examined classroom arguments at upper elementary and 
junior high school in Canada, Germany and France. In these contexts refutations 
sometimes occur, but in different forms and with different functions. Here we 
provide four examples along with discussion of the insight each gives us into the 
logic of practice and the teacher’s epistemology.  
Refutation of a Conclusion Implied by a Question 
The conclusion that is refuted may not always be stated directly. In classrooms a 
common exchange is for the teacher to ask a question with the intent of pointing 
out an error. For example, in this exchange grade five students have been trying 
to develop a formula for how many squares there are in a n  by n  grid—DAR is 
a guest teacher. They have been working with a concrete model in which three 
pyramids made of linking cubes are joined to make a roughly box shaped solid 
made up of 
2
1n , n  by ( )1+n  layers. Here they are considering a 10 by 10 grid 
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for which the solid has 10.5, 10 by 11 layers. They have multiplied these three 
numbers to find the total number of linking cubes used: 1155. In Reid (2002), 
Zack (2002), Zack and Reid (2003), and Zack and Reid (2004) can be found 
more background and details. 
DAR: Right. So, 1155 is what you get if you multiply those three 
numbers. Is that [1155] how many squares there are in a 10 
by 10 [grid]?  
Several voices: No.  
Here the question “Is that [1155] how many squares there are in a 10 by 10 
[grid]?” implies the conclusion “1155 is … how many squares there are in a 10 
by 10 [grid]” which the answer “No” refutes. This answer requires no further 
support as the students and DAR are all aware that there are 385 squares in a 10 
by 10 grid. Figure 2 represents this situation. The jagged arrow in the layout in-
dicates a refutation. 
  
Figure 2. A refutation 
(A: Answer, Q: Question) 
In terms of the final structure of the argument the statement “1155 is … how 
many squares there are in a 10 by 10 [grid]” plays no role, as it is false. Even its 
negation “1155 is not … how many squares there are in a 10 by 10 [grid]” is not 
important to the final argument. However, in the proving process it is an im-
portant statement, as the students have arrived at a point where they might expect 
1155 to be the answer—as DAR has guided them to this result ostensibly to find 
a formula that works—but at the same time they know from counting previously 
the correct answer is 385. This tension offers a motivation for further exploration 
of why the product of the three numbers in question is not the expected answer. 
Refutation of the Sufficiency of a Warrant, While Accepting the Data and 
the Conclusion 
In the previous example, no warrant was offered to justify the connection be-
tween the data and the conclusion. In this example, a warrant is offered, but it is 
not the warrant that is refuted, but the sufficiency of it to establish the connection 
between the data and the conclusion. The example comes from a grade nine class 
which is trying to explain why if two diagonals of a quadrilateral meet at their 
midpoints and are perpendicular, then the quadrilateral must be a rhombus. In 
Q 
A 
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this and the following examples, the codification of each part of the students! ar-
gument is indicated between brackets. 
Kaylee: Umm, I said cause if they meet, if they meet at the midpoint, they meet 
at the midpoint and they’re ninety degree angles [D1]  
then umm, then, it would have to be—the […]—then the sides, they 
have to be umm, like outsides have to be equal lengths. [C1] 
T: Why? 
Kaylee: Be, ummm, because they meet at, they all meet at ninety degree angles 
and at the midpoint [D1] 
but the segments are different lengths, then [D2]  
it can’t be a square [C2]  
because squares they have to be the same length. [W2] 
T: OK, but ... 
Kaylee: So it has to be a rhombus. [C1] 
T: Could it be a rectangle? Could it be a parallelogram? 
S: If it—If none. 
T: Cause there are other ones [R1]  
like the rectangle one met at the midpoint. It didn’t meet at a ninety de-
gree angle though. [B1a]  
And then the rhombus we covered. The one that made a kite met at a 
ninety degree angle, it didn’t meet at the midpoint. [B1b] 
You’re on the start, but I’m not sure that you’ve clinched it, I’m not 
sure you’ve got that final part, but you’ve got—you’re three quarters of 
the way there my dear. 
Kaylee’s warrant is a correct statement. Figures with perpendicular bisecting di-
agonals are not generally squares, as squares have the additional characteristic 
that their diagonals are the same length. However, the teacher’s objection is not 
to the truth of Kaylee’s warrant but to its sufficiency. As the teacher notes, there 
are other quadrilaterals that have not been considered and excluded. Although 
she excludes rectangles and kites from consideration at the same time, she uses 
them to back up her refutation, her point is made: Other quadrilaterals, other than 
squares and rhombuses, exist, and so excluding squares is not sufficient to guar-
antee the shape must be a rhombus. Here the refutation is directed at the warrant, 
but does not refute it—as it is correct. Instead it suggests that the warrant is in-
sufficient in the logic the teacher expects mathematical arguments to follow (see 
Figure 3). By offering an argument of her own refuting the sufficiency of 
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Kaylee’s warrant, the teacher provides that students with a hint as to the logic she 
would accept as mathematical.  
 
Figure 3. Refutation of sufficiency 
(Di: Data, Ci: Conclusion, Wi: Warrant, Ri: Refutation, 
B1a and B1b are backings supporting the warrant) 
Refutation of the Relevance of Data Offered in Support of a Conclusion 
In the previous case the refutation addressed the sufficiency of the warrant, but it 
is also possible to refute the relevance of the data offered. This example also 
comes from the grade five class looking for a formula for how many squares 
there are in an n by n grid. The students have suggested that by dividing 1155 by 
three, they can get the correct answer of 385. 
DAR: Could we have somebody … suggest a reason why we might want to 
divide by three—Mona? [C1] 
Mona: Because there’s three numbers. [D1] 
DAR: Because there’s three numbers. That’s a good reason. 
Mona: I guess. 
DAR: OK. It’s not a great reason [R1]  
but it’s a good reason. 
[Calls on another student] [R1] 
Here the teacher’s refutation is an implicit one. His qualified support, “not a 
great reason but it’s a good reason”, and shift of attention away from Mona’s re-
sponse communicates to the class that there is something wrong with what she 
has said, without specifying exactly what. Neither the data nor the conclusion is 
refuted—as the class knows them both to be true statements—, and there is no 
suggestion that the lack of a warrant in Mona’s argument is the issue—as would 
be suggested by the teacher asking “Why would we divide by three when there 
D1 C1 
D2 C2 
W2 
R1 
B1a B1b 
Refutations and the Logic of Practice 
PNA 6(1) 
7 
are three numbers?”. Instead the focus is on the relationship between the facts, 
not on the facts themselves. It is the unspoken logic of the argument that is refut-
ed. Mona has made a link between two statements, but not in a way that wins ac-
knowledgment from the teacher (see Figure 4). Note that here the teacher’s refu-
tation is based only on his authority (Sekiguchi, 1991) and unlike the teacher’s 
refutation in the previous case it does not offer any guidance for what might be 
an acceptable link. Instead he has the students guess until they come up with 
something acceptable. 
  
Figure 4. Refutation of relevance 
(Di: Data, Ri: Refutation, Ci: Conclusion) 
A Complex Refutation 
This example follows immediately after the previous one. The students have 
been working with a concrete model in which three pyramids are joined to make 
a roughly box shaped solid made up of 
2
1n , n  by 1+n  layers. 
Elaine: Because there’s three of those triangle thingies in there. [D1] 
Maya:  But then why wouldn’t you divide it by three and a half  [C2]  
because there’s a half? [D2] 
DAR: OK. How many triangles did we put together to make this 
thing? [D1] 
Several voices: Three. [D1] 
Maya: And then there’s the half. 
DAR: … So then we put together three of them and suddenly [D1]  
we had three times too many, [D3] 
so that would be a good reason to divide by three if you’ve got 
three times too many of something. [W1]  
Here Elaine is trying to answer the question why might we divide by three? The 
data she uses to justify this refers to the three pyramids—“triangle thingies”—in 
the box. But she does not offer a warrant to support the connection of this data to 
the conclusion. Maya’s refutation consists of a parallel argument, which also 
makes reference to elements visible in the box like the three pyramids and the 
half layer. Her refutation is again on the level of the logic of the argument. By 
R1 
D1 C1 
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making an argument on the basis of a coincidence or analogy—one half is just as 
much a property of the box as three is—that leads to a false conclusion, she re-
futes Elaine’s use of similar reasons. DAR then supports Elaine and in so doing 
implicitly refutes Maya’s refutation. He provides a warrant for Elaine’s original 
argument, in the process supplying a linking piece of data that shifts the logic of 
the argument from analogy—three thingies, so divide by three—to deduction—
three times too many, so divide by three. 
Maya’s refutation offers a challenge not only to Elaine’s argument but also 
to the teacher’s practice (see Figure 5). He refuted Mona’s argument by simply 
asserting his authority—C1 is the conclusion from Figure 4. If Maya had not re-
futed Elaine’s argument, he might have used his authority again to endorse it and 
moved on. In order to refute Maya’s refutation, he had to recast Elaine’s argu-
ment into a more complete, and less refutable form, including reference to a new 
piece of data (D3) and a warrant (W1) to support the drawing of the conclusion 
from it. This made the kind of logic he considered acceptable much more explic-
it.  
  
Figure 5. A complex refutation 
(Di: Data, Ci: Conclusion, Wi: Warrant) 
CONCLUSION 
These four examples illustrate some of the insights an examination of refutation 
in proving processes can provide, both into the nature and evolution of the logic 
of practice operating and into teaching practices and epistemologies related to 
proof.  
By drawing attention to the insufficiency of a warrant or data, as in the se-
cond and third examples, or forcing the teacher to be more explicit about his im-
plicit criteria for acceptable arguments, as in the fourth example, refutations pro-
vide hints as to what is the teacher’s accepted logic. These hints are of value to 
students learning to shift from everyday arguments to mathematical arguments, 
as well as to us as researchers interested in this process.  
We can also get insight into teaching practice from refutations. The first ex-
ample, of a teacher using a refutation to provide motivation for further explora-
tion, suggests an epistemology compatible with a Lakatosian view of mathemat-
D1 C1 
D2 
 
C2 
D3 
W1 
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ics as improving though confronting conclusions with counterexamples. The 
third and fourth examples reveal a teacher relying on authority as a means of ref-
utation, suggesting an approach to teaching proving that relies on examples and 
non-examples as much as or more than direct modelling. 
We believe that such research can provide insight into actual practice of 
teaching proof, which is necessary to any program of reform, as well as any 
comparison of approaches. 
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